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1 Introduction
The mechanism of economic development has been an important theme since
the fast stage of the political economies. This paper takes the ¯rst step to
incorporate two early but important perspectives of economic development
- those of Weber (1905) and Schumpeter (1934) - to analyze economic de-
velopment (and no/under development). One of the two factors of analysis
is Weber (1905)'s the "spirit of capitalism," and the other is the innovation
created by R&D activities, which Schumpeter (1934) denoted as "creative
destruction."
Modern economists have studied the determinants of economic growth
(e.g. Barro 1991). Moreover, certain cultural factors have also intrigued
economists. This literature isolates a number of variables that predict the
subsequent rates of economic growth. One general conclusion that can be
drawn is that successful explanations of economic growth must surpass nar-
row measures of economic variables and encompass political and social forces
(e.g., Hall and Jones, 1996; and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller,
2004). In particular, the results reveal important in°uences on growth from
government policies and public institutions. Some researchers (e.g., Ingle-
hart and Baker, 2000) argue that a nation's culture should be included in a
rationalization of its economic growth. Religion is an important dimension
in explanations of such literature, including geography (Sachs, 2003), insti-
tution (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002), ethnic heterogeneity
(Easterly and Levine, 1997), and climate (Easterly, and Levine, 2003). There
are some positive studies along this lines, such as Dudley and Blum (2001),
Barro and McCleary (2003), and Noland (2004).
Following this literature, we analyze the economic growth model using
both technological and cultural factors, which will yield the result that long-
run economic growth is a®ected by the spirit of capitalism in addition to the
technological conditions of R&D. Weber (1905) emphasized religious ascetic
values, termed as the "Protestant Ethic,"1 which is an ascetic endeavor for
self-help in practicing and executing one's Beruf (calling) with frugality, and
states that the accumulation of wealth is the result of religiousness. This im-
plies that accumulation itself becomes the objective. As early as 1960's, Kurz
(1968) merged this "spirit" into the Ramsey-type optimal growth model. He
1The counterpart of this may be Japanese confucianism, and the frontier spirit in the
USA.
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assumed that the utility of an agent is not derived merely from consump-
tion; rather, it also results from asset holding. This "wealth e®ects" can be
regarded as one modelization of the spirit of capitalism. Kurz (1968) inves-
tigates the results of the existence of these wealth e®ects, for example, the
occurrence of multiple equilibria. In the literature on endogenous growth
models with wealth e®ects, we encounter the pioneering trial of Zou (1994),
which demonstrates the relationship between the spirit of capitalism and
disappearance of decreasing returns of capital.
On the other hand, Schumpeter (1934) emphasized the important role
of innnovation on economic growth in a capitalist economy, which has been
supported by studies on growth accounting (e.g., Solow, 1957), which clarify
that economic growth is mainly attributable to technological progress. This
fact was incorporated into an economic growth model as late as the 1990's
by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt
(1992), among others. They endogenized technological progress derived from
R&D activities and demonstrated a mechanism for the long-run growth of
capitalist production.
To capture the above properties, the present paper unites Weber's (1958)
spirit of capitalism, which is formulated as an ¶a la Kurz type of wealth e®ects,
and Schumpeter's (1934) notion of innovation, which is constructed as an ¶a
la Aghion and Howitt type of endogenous technological change through the
improvement of the quality of intermediate goods.
The obtained results are as follows. The model of the present study
demonstrates that the relationship between innovation and the spirit of cap-
italism determines the long-run growth phase. A more intense spirit capital-
ism enhances the rate of economic growth and enables the economy's escape
from no growth traps, even if the economy has ine±cient R&D structure. It
is also demonstrated that these results are maintained under the introduction
of capital accumulation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model; Section
2.1 treats the optimization of consumption and saving with wealth e®ects,
which describe the mechanism of the supply of asset; and section 2.2 discusses
the endogenous technological change, which describes the demand of asset.
Section 3 derives the steady state of the model and pro®ers the properties
obtained from the model. In Section 4, capital accumulation is introduced
and its e®ects are investigated. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 The Model
The model of the present study consists of a household with the spirit of
capitalism and a production sector with endogenous technological progress.
The economy is endowed by the population normalized to 1, the time is
continuous, and the ¯nal goods are used as a numeraire.
2.1 The Weber Economy
The Weber economy should consist of a representative household with the
spirit of capitalism, which, following Kurz (1968), is captured by the assump-
tion that the household derives utility both from consumption (c) and per
capita wealth, namely asset holding, (A). Thus, the representative agent in
this economy has the following utility:
U =
Z 1
0
u(c; A) e¡½tdt (1)
where ½, and u(c; A) are the subjective discount rate, and an instantaneous
utility function of the representative household, respectively. The represen-
tative household has the following budget constraint:
_A = rA+ w ¡ c¡ nA: (2)
r and w are the interest rate and wage rate, respectively. n is a population
growth rate that is assumed to be non-negative throughout the present study.
We specify the instantaneous utility function as follows
u(c; A) =
(c1¡¯A¯)1¡¾ ¡ 1
1¡ ¾ ; (3)
where ¯(2 [0; 1)) is the parameter that captures the intensity of wealth ef-
fects against consumption. When ¯ = 0, there are no wealth e®ects, and the
model corresponds to the usual Ramsey type utility structure. For greater
¯, the agent has larger preference on wealth accumulation. When ¯ = 0:5,
the wealth accumulation has the same weight for the consumption of goods,
and when ¯ > 0:5, the wealth accumulation has more weight than the con-
sumption of goods. Under this speci¯cation, the optimizing condition for the
consumption growth rate is derived as©
¾ ¡ ¯(1¡ ¾)ª _c
c
¡ ¯(1¡ ¾)
_A
A
+ ½ = r ¡ n+ ¯
1¡ ¯
c
A
: (4)
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This equation corresponds to the Euler rule in usual Ramsey models.2 The
additional terms are ¯(1¡ ¾) _Â=Â and (¯=(1¡ ¯))Â, where Â ´ c=A denotes
the consumption-asset ratio. (4) implies _Â = 0 in a steady state; there-
fore, the former term is canceled out in the steady state and the latter term
produces e®ects on the long-run growth condition.
2.2 The Schumpeter Economy
The Schumpeter economy is one in which innovation is undertaken. This
study adopts an Aghion and Howitt (1992) type of Schumpeterian growth
model with an intermediate goods quality improvement structure.
2.2.1 Production
The present analysis includes three sectors: ¯nal goods, intermediate goods,
and R&D. It also contains three factors: labor which is inelastically supplied
by the population, ¯nal goods devoted to intermediate input, and knowledge
captured as a quality of intermediate goods. The ¯nal goods are produced
by labor and intermediate goods, and one unit of intermediate goods is made
from ´ units of ¯nal goods. R&D activity is assumed to be undertaken by
using labor. Thus, labor (L) is utilizeed in ¯nal goods production (LY ) and
R&D sector (LA); therefore, L = LY +LA. Furthermore, we assume that one
unit of population inelastically supplies one unit of labor force; therefore, we
can identify the aggregate labor supply L as the population. It is assumed
that the ¯nal goods are used as consumption goods C, or intermediate goods
(Z); therefore, Y = C + Z.
The producers of ¯nal goods utilize a variety of intermediate goods and
labor. Each type of intermediate good is indexed as i 2 (0; N), where N is
assumed to be a su±ciently large given constant. Each type of intermediate
good has a vertical quality level known as a "quality ladder" along which
innovations can occur. Each quality level in the ith sector has an index mi =
1; 2; :::;Mi, and the quality ladder has quality levels ¸; ¸
2; ::; ¸Mi ,respectively,
where ¸(> 1) is the exogenously given "width" of one innovation. Thus, the
intermediate goods ranked by m are equivalent to ¸ units of intermediate
goods ranked bym¡1. Thus, the quality of the cluster of intermediate goods
is the source of economic growth in this study; therefore, the productivity of
2See Appendix A1 for the detailed derivation.
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intermediate goods can be regarded as knowledge in this economy. Thus, we
denote the incumbent, as the top quality of the jth sector as q(i); therefore,
q(i) ´ ¸Mi . We also denote the ith sector's next monopolist ¯rm, namely
the monopolist ¯rm with one rank upper quality in futre, as i+. Using this
notation, the quality after one more innovation is denoted as q(i+) = ¸Mi+ =
¸Mi+1.
In this setting, each quality level m has an e±ciency level of qm, and thus,
the intermediate goods that are one grade higher in terms of quality are q
times more e±cient than those that are one grade lower in terms of quality.
Since quality-adjusted intermediate goods within the same sector are perfect
substitutes, there exists a demand for quality goods with the lowest quality-
adjusted cost. Thus, the intermediate goods that are demanded are always
those with the top quality.
We assume that the ¯nal goods production obeys constant returns to
scale and there is no complementarity among intermediate goods. Denoting
the demand of the ith intermediate goods sector, which is the current top
quality of the sector, as x(i), we can specify the production function of ¯nal
goods Y as
Y = L1¡®Y
Z N
0
fq(i)x(i)g®di; 0 < ® < 1; (5)
where LY is the labor supply allocated to the ¯nal goods production.
The ¯rst order condition (FOC) of production is obtained as
@Y
@x(i)
= p(i); and
@Y
@LY
= w; (6)
where p(i) and w are the price of the ith intermediate good of the top quality
and wage rate, respectively.
R&D ¯rms facilitate technological progress; they create a design that is
one grade higher in terms of quality than a design that has the incumbent
highest quality level. The R&D activities of the ¯rms are overtaken at the
beginning of each period, and the results are immediately evident. A success-
ful research ¯rm retains exclusive rights for the use of the intermediate goods
of this new quality level. This exclusive right is referred to as a "patent."
In this study, the intermediate goods production are produced by ´ unit
of ¯nal goods. Hence, the ¯rm that produces the ith intermediate good
maximizes the pro¯t such that
¼(i) = p(i)x(i)¡ ´ x(i): (7)
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The monopolist ¯rm that has the patent term of the current top quality
maximizes its pro¯t by considering price as a control variable. Therefore, the
FOC of the monopoly ¯rm in the ith sector with the Mith quality yields the
following:
x(i) =
·
®2
´
¸ 1
1¡®
LY q(i)
®
1¡® ; and p(i) =
´
®
: (8)
With regard to monopolistic pricing, we have the following three conditions.
First, each unit of the top quality is equivalent to ¸ > 1 unit of a good with
the next best quality. Second, a good that is one grade lower than the top
quality good is supplied at marginal cost 1=Á because the patent for this
grade expires. Third, the di®erent quality grades are perfect substitutes if
they are weighted by the quality level. Based on the above conditions, it
follows that p(i) < ¸´ is necessary for the ¯rm to create a top quality good
to monopolize the demand of that good. Therefore, a combination of (8) and
p(i) < ¸´ indicates that the condition of (8) is optimal under the assumption
that 1=® < q. The following discussion is developed such that it satis¯es the
present assumption3. Thus, only top quality goods are supplied.
The aggregate index of quality is de¯ned as
Q ´
Z N
0
q(i)
®
1¡®di: (9)
Substituting (8) into (5) and using (9) to rearrange it, we obtain the aggregate
output Y as
Y = ®
2®
1¡®´¡
®
1¡®LYQ (10)
We also note the intermediate goods input of ¯nal goods denoted by X from
the aggregation of (8) across sectors and usage of
Z = ´
Z N
0
x(i)di = ®
2
1¡®´¡
®
1¡®LYQ(= ®
2Y ): (11)
Substituting (11) into (10), we obtain the aggregate consumption as
C = (1¡ ®2)Y = (1¡ ®2)® 2®1¡®´¡ ®1¡®LY Q (12)
3This assumption implies that the width of one innovation is su±ciently large. If
1=® < ¸, the optimal pricing is given as p(i) = ¸´. This pricing does not alter the main
framework of the model; therefore, we assume that 1=® < ¸ throughout this study.
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By using (7) and (8), the pro¯t of the ith sector monopoly ¯rm with a patent
of quality Mi is obtained as follows:
¼(i) =
µ
1
®
¡ 1
¶
´x(i)
= (1¡ ®)® 1+®1¡®LY q(i) ®1¡® (13)
=
µ
1
®
¡ 1
¶
Y
Q
q(i)
®
1¡® :
2.2.2 R&D Activities
It is presumed that R&D activities for the purpose of innovating di®erent
quality levels are conducted using labor, and the success of R&D stochasti-
cally depends on the labor input. When innovation occurs in a sector, the
probability that ¯rm j in that sector will be granted a patent is assumed
to be proportional to the share of R&D input in the ith sector; therefore,
LA(i)
j=LA(i), where LA(i)
j and LA(i) represent the R&D input for the ith
sector of ¯rm j and the aggregate R&D input for the ith sector, respectively.
Therefore, from the above assumptions, it is shown that the pro¯t of
sector i of R&D ¯rm j is
max
LA(i)j
¹(i)LA(i)
j
LA(i)
v(i)¡ wLA(i)j:
The presence or absence of investment in R&D activities is determined as fol-
lows. If ¹LA(i)
j
LA(i)
v(i) < wLA(i)
j holds, the R&D activity is not pro¯table. Con-
sequently, the R&D input stops and equilibrium is attained without R&D;
therefore the probability of R&D success is 0, that is, ¹ = 0. If ¹ = 0 is
realized, the quality of the intermediate goods would remain constant over
time. If ¹LA(i)
j
LA(i)
v(i) = wLA(i)
j, a positive amount of labor would be devoted
to R&D activities and the market would be in equilibrium. The above points
can be summarized as follows:
v(i) · wLA(i)
¹(i)
with equality whenever LA(i) > 0: (14)
Thus, if the pro¯tability of R&D is positive, (14) holds with equality, and
if not, it holds with inequality and LA(i) = 0. The former case presents
endogenous growth with positive economic growth rate, and the latter with
no growth or poverty traps.
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First, we assume that the former case depicts the steady state with posi-
tive long-run growth. Under this assumption, the time di®erentiation of (14)
is calculated as
r + ¹(i+) =
¼(i)
v(i)
+ gv(i): (15)
Substituting (6), (13) and (14) into (15), we obtain
r + ¹(i+) =
¹(i)
¡
1
®
¡ 1¢ Y
Q
q(i)
®
1¡®
(1¡ ®) Y
LY
LA(i)
+
_v(i)
v(i)
: (16)
We assume that the probability of innovation success follows
¹(i) = »
QLA(i)
q(i)
®
1¡®L
; (17)
where it should be noted that the aggregate labor supply L corresponds to the
population. This arrangement implies that the whole quality of intermediate
goods Q has positive e®ects, the sector's quality has negative e®ects and
the scale of economy, which is assumed to be captured by population L,
has negative e®ects on creation of the creation of the newest quality. This
function is assumed to be linear and positively related to the R&D input rate
for labor, LA(i)=L, and negatively related to the product relative quality,
q(i)
®
1¡®=Q.
We assume symmetric equilibrium for intermediate goods sector. Using
gv(i) = n in a steady state, which can be obtained from (13) , (16) in a steady
state is produced as
¹ =
»
®
l + n¡ r; (18)
where l ´ LY =L is the rate of labor division on ¯nal goods production.
(17) and (18) yields
LA(i) =
q(i)
®
1¡®L
»Q
·
»
®
l + n¡ r
¸
: (19)
Aggregating (19) about i yields the aggregate R&D spending, denoted by
LA, as
LA = (1¡ l)L =
Z N
0
LA(i)di = L
·
1
®
l ¡ r ¡ n
»
¸
: (20)
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Hence, LA is proportional to L for a given variable r. (20) immediately yields
the relationship between r and l as follows:
r ¡ n =
½µ
1
®
+ 1
¶
l ¡ 1
¾
»; or l =
1
1 + ®
µ
r ¡ n
»
+ ®
¶
: (21)
Uniting (18) and (21), we obtain the following equilibrium ¹ as a function of
l
¹ = »(1¡ l): (22)
Thus, the innovation probability of the economy demonstrates a linearity
relationship against the rate of labor input on R&D activity.
3 Dynamics and Steady State
From the dynamics of Q de¯ned in (9), the increment of the ith sector's
innovationR(i) ´ q(i+) ®1¡®¡q(i) ®1¡® is calculated as R(i) = q(i) ®1¡® (¸ ®1¡®¡1).
Therefore, the aggregate dynamics of Q are
E( _Q) =
Z N
0
R(i)di = ¹(¸
®
1¡® ¡ 1)Q (23)
From (22) and (23), the dynamics of Q as a function of l are derived as
follows:
gQ = ¹(¸
®
1¡® ¡ 1) = »(1¡ l)¤; (24)
where ¤ ´ ¸ ®1¡®¡1 > 0 and gZ ´ _Z=Z. Since @¤=@¸ > 0, ¤ is the parameter
that immediately captures the scale of one innovation.
From (14) and (17), the aggregate value of R&D ¯rms V is calculated as
V =
Z N
0
v(i)di =
Z N
0
wLA(i)
¹(i)
di =
(1¡ ®)Y
»l
; (25)
where we use w = (1 ¡ ®)Y=(lL) for this derivation. Since we assume sym-
metric equilibrium about household, and only the asset of this economy is
the equity of R&D ¯rms, the per capita asset holding A is denoted as
A =
V
L
=
(1¡ ®)y
»l
: (26)
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A substitution of y from (10) into (26) yields
A =
1¡ ®
»
®
2®
1¡®´¡
1
1¡®Q: (27)
This equation implies that asset holding in the economy is proportionally
related to the technological level, and it grows at the same rate as the quality
index. (12) implies that the per capita consumption c ´ C=L grows at the
same rate as the quality index. Thus, the steady state, wherein all variables
grow at constant rates and the Euler equation (4) is satis¯ed, can exists.
Taking C = cL into account, the time di®erential on (12) and (26) pro-
vides the following steady state growth rate:
gc = gY ¡ n = gy = gA = gQ: (28)
Substituting (12), (26), and (28) into (4), we obtain
¾gQ = r ¡ n¡ ½+B(1 + ®)»l; (29)
where B ´ ¯=(1¡ ¯). Since @B=@¯ > 0, this parameter can be regarded as
capturing the intensity of wealth e®ects.
Substituting (21), (22) and (24) into (29), we can analytically obtain the
equilibrium division of labor to production,
l¤ =
½
»
+ 1 + ¾¤¡
1
®
+ 1
¢
+B(1 + ®) + ¾¤
; (30)
and the growth rate of the economy,
g¤y = g
¤
Q =
1
®
+B(1 + ®)¡ ½
»¡
1
®
+ 1
¢
+B(1 + ®) + ¾¤| {z }
¹¤
¤: (31)
(31) implies that a higher e±ciency of R&D, » and ¤, and a lower subjective
discount rate, ½, accelerate the growth rate. These properties are shared
with the usual R&D-based growth model. Regarding the wealth e®ects, B,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition I The wealth e®ects increase the economic growth rate.
Proof: Di®erentiating (31) byB, we immediately obtain
@g¤y
@B
> 0. (Q.E.D.)
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Condition for long-run positive endogenous growth We have as-
sumed the positive pro¯tability of R&D, namely holding equality with (14).
l 2 (0; 1) is necessary for the steady state obtained above to be a feasible
equilibrium that is consist with the positive R&D investment. Since (30)
shows that l¤ > 0 constantly holds, the restriction is eventually determined
to be l¤ < 1, which yields
B >
1
1 + ®
µ
½
»
¡ 1
®
¶
: (32)
Namely, the economy with su±ciently high » has a balance growth path with
a positive growth rate for all B; however, a su±ciently high B is necessary
for the economy with low » to achive positive long-run growth. Since B
represents the intensity of the wealth e®ects, we can sum up the following
proposition about the relationship between wealth e®ects and no growth
traps.
Proposition II If an economy has low R&D e±ciency, su±ciently high
wealth e®ects captured by B are necessary for positive endogenous growth.
If this condition is not met, the economy would be caught in poverty
traps.
4 An Extension: Economy with Capital
In this section, we add an extension of the basic model developed in the pre-
vious part of the study. We introduce capital accumulation into the economy,
and then, illustrate the robustness of the main results derived in the basic
model. For this purpose, we restrict our concern to the steady state analysis.
4.1 Production and R&D Activities
Following in an ¶a la Romer (1990) manner, we introduce capital into the
basic model. Namely, the new arrangement is that one unit of intermediate
goods is made by ´ units of durable goods, instead of ¯nal goods, and we call
the durable goods capital. Then, ¯nal goods are used as consumption goods
C, and are accumulated as the capital goods (K); therefore, Y = C + _K.
Thus, the production function of ¯nal goods Y and the FOCs of produc-
tion are the same as (5) and (6), respectively. In this section, the intermediate
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goods of production are generated by ´ unit of ¯nal goods. Hence, the ¯rm
producing the ith intermediate good maximizes the pro¯t such that
¼(i) = p(i)x(i)¡ ´ r x(i): (33)
The FOC of the monopoly ¯rm in the ith sector with theMith quality yields
the following:
x(i) =
·
®2
´ r
¸ 1
1¡®
LY q(i)
®
1¡® ; and p(i) =
´ r
®
: (34)
The structure of intermediate goods sectors is essentially same as the model
without capital. We can also use the same quality index de¯ned in (9). Here,
we introduce a new variable K, which denotes aggregate capital accumula-
tion. Aggregating (34) across sectors yields
K = ´
Z N
0
x(i)di = ´
Z N
0
x(i)di = ´
·
®2
´ r
¸ ®
1¡®
LYQ: (35)
Therefore, we obtain the interest rate r as
r = ®2´¡®K®¡1L1¡®Y Q
1¡® (36)
Eliminating r and x(i) from (34) by using (35) and (36) yields
Y = ´¡®K®L1¡®Y Q
1¡® or y = ´¡®k®(Q l)1¡®; (37)
where k ´ K=L denotes per capita capital stock.
By using (5), (33) and (34), the pro¯t of the ith sector monopoly ¯rm
with a patent of quality Mi is obtained as follows:
¼(i) =
µ
1
®
¡ 1
¶
´ r x(i)
= (1¡ ®)®Y
Q
q(i)
®
1¡® : (38)
Because R&D structure is assumed to be same as the basic model, ob-
tained equilibrium conditions are shared by those of the basic model except
for the determination of interest rate r given in (36) and pro¯t of R&D ¼(i)
derived as (38).
13
The counterparts of (18) - (21) in this version are respectively given as
¹ = ® » l + n¡ r; (39)
LA(i) =
q(i)
®
1¡®L
»Q
(® » l + n¡ r); (40)
LA = (1¡ l)L =
Z N
0
LA(i)di = L
·
® l ¡ r ¡ n
»
¸
; (41)
r ¡ n = ©(1 + ®)l ¡ 1ª»; or l = 1
1 + ®
µ
r ¡ n
»
+ 1
¶
: (42)
The introducing capital doesn't change (22) - (25) on the other hand.
4.2 Steady State
Because the model studied hire contains capital accumulation, the system
has transition path. However, we concentrate our analysis on long-run steady
state.
We assume symmetric equilibrium about household, and assets of this
economy consist of equity of R&D ¯rms V derived in (25) and capital stock
K, therefore the per capita asset holding A in this case is denoted as
A¤ =
V ¤ +K¤
L¤
=
·
(1¡ ®)r¤
»l¤®2
+ 1
¸
k¤; (43)
where we use r = ®2y=k, which can be derived from (36).
The resource constraint of the ¯nal goods Y = C+ _K gives c = y¡ _k¡nk.
From this, (36), and (37), we obtained the followings:
c¤ =
r
®2
k¤ ¡ g¤kk¤ ¡ nk¤ =
µ
r¤
®2
¡ g¤Q ¡ n
¶
k¤; (44)
g¤c = g
¤
k = g
¤
y = gY ¡ n = g¤Q (45)
From (22) and (39), we can give the steady state interest rate r¤ as a function
of labor allocation rate l¤ as
r¤ = (1 + ®)» l¤ + n¡ »: (46)
Substituting (24), (42), (43), (44), (45) and (46) into (4), and using the
notation Â, we can obtain the equilibrium condition about l as
Â = ¡(l) =
1
B
£¡©®¤ + (1 + ®)ª» l + ®»¤ + » + ½¤ : (47)
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The de¯nition of Â yields
Â = Â(l)
(1 + ®+ ®2¤)»l + (1¡ ®2)n¡ (1 + ®2¤)»
1¡®
»
(n¡ ») + l l: (48)
These two equation determine the l in the stady state. (47) and (48) are
depicted in Figure 1. (See Appendix A2 for detail derivations.) From Figure
I (and the deicussion in Appendix A2), increase of B gins up the growth
rate in the steady state through decreace of l¤. Thus, we can obtain the
equivalent of Proposition I as follows:
Proposition I' The wealth e®ects increase economic growth rate.
Proof: Since
@gQ
@l
< 0, proving
@gQ
@B
> 0 is equivalent to proving @l
@B
< 0.
@l
@B
< 0 is provided in Appendix II. (Q.E.D.)
l 2 (0; 1) is also necessary for the steady state with positive long-run
growth. From the discussion in Appendix 2, the condition is Â(1) > ¡(1),
which is transformed into
B >
®» + n(1¡ ®)
®» + n(1¡ ®2)| {z }
¢
µ
½
»
¡ ®
¶
: (49)
Because ¢ is positive, the determination on positive long-run growth depends
on (½=») ¡ ®; therefore, the essentially akin mechanism between ½ and » is
obtained as follows.
Proposition II' If the economy has low R&D e±ciency, su±ciently high
wealth e®ects captured by B are necessary for positive endogenous growth.
5 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates the relationship between long-run growth, real-
ized by endogenous technological progress, which is captured by activities
intended to improve for quality of intermediate goods, and the "spirit of
capitalism," which is captured by the preference for wealth accumulation. If
the e±ciency of innovation is low, large parameter of the spirit is necessary
for long-run positive growth, and the growth rate positively depends on the
parameter. Thus, a combination of the spirit of capitalism and innovation
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a®ects the long-run growth of an economy; thus, this paper can be considered
as a trial that incorporates the culture factor into an orthodox R&D-based
growth model.
There are some topics left to be examined. The determination mech-
anism of the intensity of the wealth e®ects remains because we assume it
constantly given. These cultural, as well as technological, properties vary
based on regional, racial, and historical di®erences. Last, but not least, one
important factor that the present study ignores is the monetary e®ect. Since
the transmission mechanism of money demand and supply on the economy
are so complicated and controversial, we concentrated our analysis on the
real e®ects. Importing of these factors will constitute the future agenda for
this study.
Appendix
A1 Optimization on the household with wealth e®ects
The representative agent in this economy is assumed to have the utility (1).
The optimal policy for the representative agent is to maximize (1) under the
constraint of (2). The Hamiltonian is given as
H(t) = u(c(t); A(t)) + ¸(t)©r(t)A(t) + w(t)¡ c(t)¡ nA(t)ª;
and we obtain the two following ¯rst order conditions:
@H(t)
@c(t)
=
@u(c(t); A(t))
@c(t)
+ ¸(t)(¡1) = 0;
½¸(t)¡ _¸ (t) = @H(t)
@A(t)
=
@u(c(t); A(t)
@A(t)
¡ ¸(t)(r(t)¡ n):
The transversality condition is given as follows:
lim
t!1
¸(t)A(t) = 0:
From these conditions, we obtain the Euler equation as follows:
½¡
_¸ (t)
¸(t)
= r(t)¡ n+ uA(c(t); A(t))
uc(c(t); A(t))
:
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We specify the instantaneous utility function as (3). Using this speci¯cation,
the above equation is rewritten as©
¾ + ¯
¡
1¡ ¾¢ª _c(t)
c(t)
¡ ¯(1¡ ¾)
_A(t)
A(t)
+ ½ = r(t)¡ n+ ¯ c(t)
A(t)
:
A2 Determination of l¤ in the economy with capital
(47) and (48) determine the steady state labor allocation l¤. We can easily
verify that ¡ is a decreasing linear function, and has a ¯xed point (¹l; 0),
where ¹l ´ 1+®¤+½=»
1+®+®¤
(> 0). ¹l > 1 holds for su±ciently small » (» < ½=®), and
¹l 2 (0; 1) holds for su±ciently large » (» > ½=®). As » can be the e±ciency of
R&D, the former case corresponds to the economy with low R&D e±ciency,
and the latter case corresponds to the one with high R&D e±ciency.
Â(l) is a non-linear function with Â(0) = 0 and Â(1) > 0.4 From the
de¯nition of Â, we have two feasible conditions on c¤ and A¤, which are
derived as
c¤ > 0 =) l > (1 + ®
2¤)» ¡ (1¡ ®2)n
(1 + ®+ ®2¤)»
(´ lc);
A¤ > 0 =) l > 1¡ ®
»
(´ lA):
Therefore, the steady state conditioned by (47) and (48) must satisfy l >
maxflc; lAg. Since lc ¡ lA = ®
2(1+®¤)»+(1¡®)n
(1+®+®2¤)»
> 0, we obtain the condition
about the steady state labor allocation l¤ as l¤ > lc ´ l.
We have two cases: l 2 (0; 1) and l < 0.5 Under the case of l < 0, lc < 0
produces (1 + ®2¤)» ¡ (1 ¡ ®)n < 0. Uniting this and ¤ > 1, we obtain
(1+®2)»¡ (1¡®2)n < 0. Therefore, » < 1¡®2
1+®2
n < n holds. Noting n¡» > 0,
di®erentiating Â(l) produces
dÂ(l)
dl
=Â(l)
24 (1 + ®+ ®2¤)»
(1 + ®+ ®2¤)»l + (1¡ ®2)n¡ (1 + ®2¤)» +
1¡®
»
(n¡ »)n
1¡®
»
(n¡ ») + l
o
l
35 > 0:
(50)
4Â(1) > 0 is immediately proved as follows:
Â(1) =
®» + (1¡ ®2)n
1¡®
» (n¡ ») + 1
=
®» + (1¡ ®2)n
(1¡ ®)n+ ®» » > 0:
5It is easily veri¯able that l > 1 is infeasible under the assumption of a non-negative
population growth rate because lc > 1 is made as ¡®» > (1¡ ®)n.
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Thus, function Â(l) is an increasing function in l 2 (0; 1).
Under the case of l 2 (0; 1), Â(l) is de¯ned on l 2 (l; 1) because of lA > 0,
which yields n ¡ » > ¡ »
1¡® l. Noting this relationship, di®erentiating Â(l)
yields
dÂ(l)
dl
>
Â(l)
24 (1 + ®+ ®2¤)»
(1 + ®+ ®2¤)»l + (1¡ ®2)n¡ (1 + ®2¤)» ¡
»l
1¡ ®
1¡®
»n
1¡®
»
(n¡ ») + l
o
l
35
= Â(l)
®2
©
(1¡ ®)¤n+ (1 + ®¤)»ª©
(1 + ®+ ®2¤)»l + (1¡ ®2)n¡ (1 + ®2¤)»ªn1¡®
»
(n¡ ») + l
o > 0:
(51)
(50) and (51) demonstrate that Â(l) is increasing in the domain of l in both
cases; therefore, the two functions in the two cases of ¹l > 1 and ¹l 2 (0; 1) are
depicted in Figure 1 (a) and (b), respectively.6
Noting the increasing property of Â(l), a totally di®erentiation of (47)
yields
¾»(¡1)¤dl¤ = BÂ¤@Â
¤
@l¤
dl¤ + Â¤dB + (1 + ®) »dl¤;
therefore,
dl¤
dB
= ¡Â¤
·
¾»¤ + (1 + ®) » +BÂ¤
@Â¤
@l¤
¸¡1
> 0: (52)
Thus, we can conclude that dl¤=dB < 0 always holds, which can also be
con¯rmed by Figure 1, and is summarized in Proposition I'.
Next, we seek the condition on the relationship between positive long-run
growth and the spirit of capitalism captured by B. As is depicted in Figure
1, if ¡(1) < Â(1), the economy has inner equilibrium l¤ and if not, corner
solution l¤ = 1 is an equilibrium. Therefore, the condition that the economy
has a positive long-run growth is ¡(1) < Â(1), it can be transformed into
(49), and it is the counterpart of the capital accumulation version of (32). In
6In drawing panel (b), we use l > ¹l for all l. The case of l < 0 is trivial because ¹l > 0.
Moreover, the case of l 2 (0; 1) is also illustrated by the following simple calculation:
¹l ¡ l = ®
2(1¡ ®)¤
(1 + ®+ ®2¤)(1 + ®+ ®¤)
+
½
»(1 + ®+ ®2¤)
+
(1¡ ®2)n
»(1 + ®+ ®¤)
> 0:
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the case of ¹l 2 (0; 1) (represented in Figure 1 (b)), it is trivial that an inner
solution l¤ always exists because liml!0 Â(l) = 0 for l < 0 and liml!l Â(l) = 0
for l 2 (0; 1). Summing up these results, we obtain Proposition II'.
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